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Hardware Trojan Detection Schemes Using Path Delay and Side-Channel Analysis

  • Farahmandi F
  • Huang Y
  • Mishra P
Springer International Publishing, (2020), 221-271
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-30596-3_11
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Abstract

Power-side channel attacks use the amount of power consumption and transient/dynamic current leakage to attack the design. A device like an oscilloscope can be used to collect power traces, and those traces are statistically analyzed using correlation analysis to...

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Farahmandi, F., Huang, Y., & Mishra, P. (2020). Hardware Trojan Detection Schemes Using Path Delay and Side-Channel Analysis. In System-on-Chip Security (pp. 221–271). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30596-3_11

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