Security analysis and comparison of the SHA-3 finalists BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein

Abstract

In 2007, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology announced a call for the design of a new cryptographic hash algorithm in response to the vulnerabilities identified in widely employed hash functions, such as MD5 and . NIST received many submissions, 51 of which got accepted to the first round. At present, 5 candidates are left in the third round of the competition. At NIST's second SHA-3 Candidate Conference 2010, Andreeva et al. provided a provable security classification of the second round SHA-3 candidates in the ideal model. In this work, we revisit this classification for the five SHA-3 finalists. We evaluate recent provable security results on the candidates, and resolve remaining open problems for Grøstl, JH, and Skein. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.