Implementations of cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Masking techniques are employed to counter side-channel attacks that are based on multiple measurements of the same operation on different data. Most currently known techniques require new random values after every nonlinear operation and they are not effective in the presence of glitches. We present a new method to protect implementations. Our method has a higher computational complexity, but requires random values only at the start, and stays effective in the presence of glitches.
CITATION STYLE
Nikova, S., Rechberger, C., & Rijmen, V. (2006). Threshold implementations against side-channel attacks and glitches. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4307 LNCS, pp. 529–545). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11935308_38
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