I Plan Therefore I Choose: Free-Choice Bias Due to Prior Action-Probability but Not Action-Value

Abstract

According to an emerging view, decision-making, and motor planning are tightly entangled at the level of neural processing. Choice is influenced not only by the values associated with different options, but also biased by other factors. Here we test the hypothesis that preliminary action planning can induce choice biases gradually and independently of objective value when planning overlaps with one of the potential action alternatives. Subjects performed center-out reaches obeying either a clockwise or counterclockwise cue-response rule in two tasks. In the probabilistic task, a pre-cue indicated the probability of each of the two potential rules to become valid. When the subsequent rule-cue unambiguously indicated which of the pre-cued rules was actually valid (instructed trials), subjects responded faster to rules pre-cued with higher probability. When subjects were allowed to choose freely between two equally rewarded rules (choice trials) they chose the originally more likely rule more often and faster, despite the lack of an objective advantage in selecting this target. In the amount task, the pre-cue indicated the amount of potential reward associated with each rule. Subjects responded faster to rules pre-cued with higher reward amount in instructed trials of the amount task, equivalent to the more likely rule in the probabilistic task. Yet, in contrast, subjects showed hardly any choice bias and no increase in response speed in favor of the original high-reward target in the choice trials of the amount task. We conclude that free-choice behavior is robustly biased when predictability encourages the planning of one of the potential responses, while prior reward expectations without action planning do not induce such strong bias. Our results provide behavioral evidence for distinct contributions of expected value and action planning in decision-making and a tight interdependence of motor planning and action selection, supporting the idea that the underlying neural mechanisms overlap.