We study efficiency tradeoffs for secure two-party computation in presence of malicious behavior. We investigate two main approaches for defending against malicious behavior in Yao's garbled circuit method: (1) Committed-input scheme, (2) Equality-checker scheme. We provide asymptotic and concrete analysis of communication and computation costs of the designed protocols. We also develop a weaker definition of security (k-leaked model) for malicious two-party computation that allows for disclosure of some information to a malicious party. We design more efficient variations of Yao's protocol that are secure in the proposed model. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Mohassel, P., & Franklin, M. (2006). Efficiency tradeoffs for malicious two-party computation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3958 LNCS, pp. 458–473). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11745853_30
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