A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions

Abstract

I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms of dispositions. The basic idea is (roughly) that C causes E when C is the stimulus of some disposition of which E is the manifestation. Such an account suggests that causes are conditionally sufficient (rather than necessary) for their effects. I consider what semantics for subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals this requires, and examine the consequences for making a distinction between causes and mere conditions and between collective or complete causes and mere parts of causes. Finally, I review the significance of this account of causation for a metaphysics of powers (potencies, essentially dispositional properties). I argue that it would be a mistake to see a successful dispositional account of causation (whether this or another account) as vindicating an ontology of powers.