Equitable allocations of indivisible goods

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Abstract

In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic efficiency. We show that the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satisfies equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up to one good in pseudopolynomial time. Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved simultaneously.

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APA

Freeman, R., Sikdar, S., Vaish, R., & Xia, L. (2019). Equitable allocations of indivisible goods. In IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 2019-August, pp. 280–286). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/40

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