Intellectual virtues, epistemic democracy, and the wisdom of "the people"

Abstract

Epistemic democrats argue that democratic governance is justified in part by superior epistemic performance. Although recent work on the subject has engaged formal models and some empirical evidence, epistemic democrats have yet to engage the intellectual virtue literature. In this chapter, I explore this possibility, and pursue two theses. The first thesis, what I call the Obvious Conclusion, contends that intellectual virtues improve the epistemic functioning of a democracy. Although there are good reasons to think this, the Obvious Conclusion admits of complexity and involves some important caveats. Second, certain kinds of partisan populist movements, what I call "Manichean populisms, " can be corrosive of those institutions necessary for the cultivation and sustenance of intellectual virtues. Because of this, Manichean populisms are often detrimental to the health of democratic institutions.