Abstract
Digital signature scheme allows a user to sign a message in such a way that anyone can verify the signature, but no one can forge the signature on any other message. In this paper, we show that Xie and Yu's threshold signature scheme, Huang and Chang's threshold proxy signature scheme, Qian, Cao and Xue's pairing-based threshold proxy signature scheme, Xue and Cao's multi-proxy signature scheme and Zhou et al.'s proxy multi-signature scheme are all insecure against the forgery attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Cao, T., & Lin, D. (2005). Security analysis of some threshold signature schemes and multi-signature schemes. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3822 LNCS, pp. 233–241). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11599548_20
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
