Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4] to provide delegation of decryption rights. PRE allows re-encryption of a ciphertext intended for Alice (delegator) to a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) via a semi-honest proxy, who should not learn anything about the underlying message. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Patterson introduced the notion of certificateless public key cryptography which offers the advantage of identity-based cryptography without suffering from key escrow problem. The existing certificateless PRE (CLPRE) schemes rely on costly bilinear pairing operations. In ACM ASIA-CCS SCC 2015, Srinivasan et al. proposed the first construction of a certificateless PRE scheme without resorting to pairing in the random oracle model. In this work, we demonstrate a flaw in the CCA-security proof of their scheme. Also, we present the first construction of a CLPRE scheme without pairing which meets CCA security under the computational Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption in the random oracle model.
CITATION STYLE
Sharmila Deva Selvi, S., Paul, A., & Pandu Rangan, C. (2017). An efficient certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme without pairing. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10592 LNCS, pp. 413–433). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68637-0_25
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