Patriotism and Civic Virtue

Abstract

While lay discussion of patriotism tends to treat it as a virtue, academics are divided on this issue. Some agree, but others take the virtuousness of patriotism to be conditional, and still others regard it as clearly non-virtuous. This diversity of opinion has its primary source in differences in what civic virtue is, rather than in what patriotism is. The latter is typically understood as a morally serious form of abiding love of, or loyalty to, one's country. Agreement on the nature of civic virtue, on the other hand, does not go much beyond the claim that it is a set of valuable dispositions, associated with the role of citizen, that contribute to the well-being of a political community. There is disagreement as to whether civic virtue is a human excellence, whether it contributes to a good life, how much civic behavior it requires, and whether it is relative to contingent social norms. There is also disagreement as to whether it involves behavior that is contrary to universal-istic moral norms and whether the status of a trait as a civic virtue can be defended without reliance on a comprehensive moral view. Importantly, there is also disagreement as to whether civic virtue must include certain dispositions to reflect and judge or whether it can be conceived in a purely instrumental way. This chapter discusses the impact these disagreements have had on the various attitudes theorists have taken toward the claim that patriotism is a civic virtue. Keywords Bad faith • Common good • Democracy • Equality • Epistemic condition • Freedom • Instrumental virtue • Justice • Kateb • Keller • Love • Loyalty • MacIntyre • Moral condition • Nationalism • Political argument • Rawls • Repub-licanism • Situationism • Social norms