The Natural Faculty of Empathy as a Basis for Human Rights

Abstract

Cultural relativists criticize human rights naturalism as untenable and outmoded. However, at the very least, a radical version of cultural relativism seems to rely on false premises itself and goes too far when it neglects any foundation of human rights in human nature. The purpose of this essay is to show why human rights are both conceptually and empirically based on the natural human faculty of empathy. The argument begins with an analysis of the concept of human rights, understood as expressing a certain minimal standard of morality that, in turn, implies an altruistic motivation. Both analytical arguments and neuropsychological findings suggest that original altruistic behaviour may only be explained by compassion, which ultimately requires empathy. Empathy is a natural and universal human faculty, cross-culturally developed in early childhood, and rooted in neurophysiological mirroring mechanisms. However, a naturalistic account of human rights – as proposed in this essay – does not necessarily imply any reductionism. It is further incapable of providing any logical argument for the validity of human rights. After all, besides showing that radical cultural relativism is wrong, it may at least provide some discursive support for human rights claims.