New identity-based proxy re-encryption schemes to prevent collusion attacks

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose two new constructions of identity-based proxy re-encryption (IB-PRE). The most important feature of our schemes is that we no longer need the semi-trust assumption on the proxy. Moreover, we describe the IND-PrID-CCA/CPA security models for an IB-PRE in a single-hop scenario, and then give a general analysis on the relationship between the IND-PrID-CPA security model and the desirable PRE properties: unidirectionality, collusion "safeness" and non-transitivity. Our first scheme has no ciphertext expansion through the re-encryption and is proven IND-PrID-CPA secure in the random oracle model. The second one achieves the IND-PrID-CCA security. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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Wang, L., Wang, L., Mambo, M., & Okamoto, E. (2010). New identity-based proxy re-encryption schemes to prevent collusion attacks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6487 LNCS, pp. 327–346). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17455-1_21

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