The conventional economic argument favors the use of market-based instruments over ‘command-and-control’ regulation. This viewpoint, however, is often limited in the description and characteristics of the latter; namely, environmental standards are often portrayed as lacking structured abatement incentives. Yet contemporary forms of command-and-control regulation, such as standards stipulated via benchmarking, have the potential to be efficient. We provide a first formal analysis of environmental standards based on performance benchmarks. We show that under specific conditions, standards can provide efficient incentives to improve environmental performance.
CITATION STYLE
Gerigk, J., MacKenzie, I. A., & Ohndorf, M. (2015). A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards. Environmental and Resource Economics, 62(1), 59–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9815-7
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