The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate-Confirmed Appointee Vacancies

Abstract

We examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate-confirmed presidential appointee vacancies over time. We argue that key Senate pivots in the appointment process are more (or less) likely to extend a vacancy based on an agency's discretionary spending outlays to the Senator's state. We combine a uniquely thorough dataset on PAS vacancies with federal budget data by state and agency and show that co-partisan Senate pivots in the confirmation process seem to reward presidents with shorter vacancies when a given agency is more generous in discretionary outlays. However, under divided government, vacancies lengthen in presidentially aligned agencies as status quo agency outlays increase to key pivots. Our work speaks to both the pivotal politics of the Senate and the extent to which presidents and Senators might value filled (vacant) PAS positions.