Relationalism

Abstract

In the first chapter we saw that the principle of factivity and the principle of closure, in order to be efficaciously employed in the argument of the factivity problem, have to be rephrased to account for the contextualist understanding of the semantics of “know”. It could be wondered, therefore, if other principles that might tacitly play a role in the argument of the conundrum need a similar treatment. In this chapter we will try to reply to this question by scrutinizing the solution proposed by Baumann, who suggests reformulating both the principle of the transmission of warrant and the principle of closure. We will see that Baumann claims that the warrant necessary to know (according to a certain epistemic standard) that a given knowledge ascription “S knows that p” is true is different from the warrant necessary to know that p is true. We will maintain that, although Baumann’s proposal can overcome the factivity problem, it regrettably turns out to be based on an unjustified and implausible assumption. In the final section of this chapter we will also claim that the only way in which it seems possible to satisfy Baumann’s desiderata about contextualism is that of refusing the factivity principle in favour of a relativist version of it.