Kant’s Second Paralogism in Context: The Critique of Pure Reason on Whether Matter Can Think

Abstract

The paper puts Kant’s second paralogism in the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason into the context of eighteenth century debates on materialism. In the second paralogism, Kant argues that neither dualism nor materialism about the human mind can be established, while focusing on a received anti-materialist argument that he dubs the “Achilles argument”. The Achilles argument that Kant ultimately rejects is based on the assumption that the unity of thought requires a unified substratum and thus an immaterial soul. I argue (1) that the second paralogism is not a paralogism formally but (2) nonetheless provides an illuminating discussion of the shortcomings of the Achilles argument. In doing so, I attempt to identify the contemporary background for Kant’s reconstruction of this argument.