In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist's thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
CITATION STYLE
Mizrahi, M. (2013). The pessimistic induction: A bad argument gone too far. Synthese, 190(15), 3209–3226. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0138-3
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