We propose simple, realistic protocols for polling that allow the responder to plausibly repudiate his response, while at the same time allow accurate statistical analysis of poll results. The protocols use simple physical objects (envelopes or scratch-off cards) and can be performed without the aid of computers. One of the main innovations of this work is the use of techniques from theoretical cryptography to rigorously prove the security of a realistic, physical protocol. We show that, given a few properties of physical envelopes, the protocols are unconditionally secure in the universal composability framework. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Moran, T., & Naor, M. (2006). Polling with physical envelopes: A rigorous analysis of a human-centric protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4004 LNCS, pp. 88–108). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_7
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