Browser-based security protocols perform cryptographic tasks within the constraints of commodity browsers. They are the bearer protocols for many security critical applications on the Internet. Roughly speaking, they are the offspring of key exchange and secure sessions protocols. Although browser-based protocols are widely deployed, their security has not been formally proved. We provide a security model for the analysis of browser-based protocols based on the Universal Composability framework. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Gajek, S. (2008). A universally composable framework for the analysis of browser-based security protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5324 LNCS, pp. 283–297). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1_20
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