Human dignity: Functions and meanings

Abstract

The concept of human dignity has several possible linguistic functions, which imply different and quite distinct meanings in various contexts. As Wittgenstein notes in his Philosophical Investigations, in order to understand the meaning of a word or a concept 'one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.' By applying a Wittgensteinian methodology in this paper, I seek to identify and depict different language spheres in which the concept of human dignity has different meanings, which may, at times, be contradictory. The main reason for conflicts regarding the essence of human dignity derives from the fact that changing the context of a word may generate a misunderstanding of its meaning: 'Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!' Furthermore, following Nathan Rotenstreich, I contend that human dignity is a rather eclectic and ambiguous notion that cannot be precisely defined. However, I do believe that a better understanding of the meanings of this term is possible by outlining and mapping the main linguistic functions of human dignity, an undertaking that will help clarify both the ambiguity concerning human dignity and the recurrent political use of this term. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.