Vote-trading in international institutions

40Citations
Citations of this article
39Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

There is evidence that countries trade votes among each other in international institutions on a wide range of issues, including the use of force, trade issues, and elections of judges. Vote-trading has been criticized as being a form of corruption, undue influence, and coercion. Contrary to common wisdom, however, I argue in this article that the case for introducing policy measures against vote-trading cannot be made out on the basis of available evidence. This article sets out an analytical framework for analysing vote-trading in international institutions, focusing on three major contexts in which vote-trading may generate benefits and costs: (1) agency costs (collective good), (2) coercive tendering, and (3) agency costs (constituents). The applicability of each context depends primarily on the type of decision in question - i.e. preference-decision or judgement-decision - and the interests that countries are expected to maximize when voting. The analytical framework is applied to evidence of vote-trading in four institutions, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the World Trade Organization, and the International Whaling Commission. The application of the analysis reveals that while vote-trading can create significant costs, there is only equivocal evidence to this effect, and in several cases vote-trading generates important benefits. © EJIL 2008; all rights reserved.

References Powered by Scopus

How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations

432Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force

220Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Outside options and the logic of security council action

185Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Cited by Powered by Scopus

An introduction to international institutional law

257Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

252Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

The political economy of the united nations security council: Money and influence

112Citations
N/AReaders
Get full text

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Eldar, O. (2008). Vote-trading in international institutions. European Journal of International Law, 19(1), 3–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chn001

Readers' Seniority

Tooltip

PhD / Post grad / Masters / Doc 16

67%

Professor / Associate Prof. 3

13%

Lecturer / Post doc 3

13%

Researcher 2

8%

Readers' Discipline

Tooltip

Social Sciences 16

64%

Business, Management and Accounting 4

16%

Economics, Econometrics and Finance 3

12%

Arts and Humanities 2

8%

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free