Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

This article offers a broad survey of the theory of evolution in games. Section “Normal Form Games” introduces normal form games, a simple and commonly studied model of strategic interaction. Section “Static Notions of Evolutionary Stability” presents the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy, a static definition of stability proposed for this normal form context. Section “Population Games” defines population games, a general model of strategic interaction in large populations. Section “Revision Protocols” offers the notion of a revision protocol, an individual-level description of behavior used to define the population-level processes of central concern. Most of the article concentrates on these population-level processes: section “Deterministic Dynamics” considers deterministic differential equation models of game dynamics; section “Stochastic Dynamics” studies stochastic models of evolution based on Markov processes; and section “Local Interaction” presents deterministic and stochastic models of local interaction. Section “Applications” records a range of applications of evolutionary game theory, and section “Future Directions” suggests directions for future research. Finally, section “Bibliography” offers an extensive list of primary references.