In this paper, we introduce a framework for providing incentives for honest participation in global-scale distributed trust management infrastructures. Our system can improve the quality of information supplied by these systems by reducing free-riding and encouraging honesty. Our approach is twofold: (1) we provide rewards for participants that advertise their experiences to others, and (2) impose the credible threat of halting the rewards, for a substantial amount of time, for participants who consistently provide suspicious feedback. For this purpose we develop an honesty metric which can indicate the accuracy of feedback. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
CITATION STYLE
Fernandes, A., Kotsovinos, E., Östring, S., & Dragovic, B. (2004). Pinocchio: Incentives for honest participation in distributed trust management. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2995, 63–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24747-0_6
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.