JAM: Mitigating jellyfish attacks in wireless ad hoc networks

Abstract

In recent years, wireless ad hoc networks (WANETs) have become very popular due to their wide range of applications and their ability to be deployed under normal and harsh conditions while supporting high data rates. Although many intrusion detection and trust-based systems have been developed to protect ad hoc networks against misbehaviors such as rushing attacks, query-flood attacks, and selfishness of nodes, these defense mechanisms are still not able to detect protocol compliant attacks called Jellyfish (JF) attacks. They target closed-loop flows such as TCP that are responsive to network conditions like delay and packet losses and can easily partition the network. In this paper, we introduce a security scheme called JAM (Jellyfish Attacks Mitigator) which can be used to detect and mitigate Jellyfish attacks in ad hoc networks. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.