Inclusive candidate selection and corruption: evidence from Spanish regions

Abstract

High corruption perceptions among voters have been shown to have dire consequences for political participation, trust in institutions and ability to solve collective action problems. Research on corruption focussed on macro- and micro-level explanations to explain persistent corruption in developed countries. This article adds a new meso-level variable to the picture: party primaries. While until recently selection of candidates was the privilege of narrow party elites, many Western European parties have introduced primaries to select candidates for public offices. This study posits that this attempt at increasing intraparty democracy has negative consequences regarding corruption perceptions and suggests three mechanisms through which primaries increase corruption perceptions among supporters of parties that use them. First, primaries can be perceived as a means of ‘window-dressing’, second, primaries can suffer from vote buying, and third, candidates in primaries have incentives to campaign on anti-elitism to distinguish themselves from party elite candidates, increasing corruption salience. The theoretical argument is tested using a novel dataset on primaries in Spanish regions and corruption perceptions in a difference-in-difference design. The results support the hypothesis that primaries increase corruption perceptions among supporters of parties that use them and hint that this result is driven by the process of competitive primaries rather than a restriction of competition.