Secure channels are one of the most pivotal building blocks of cryptography today. Internet connections, secure messaging, protected IoT data, etc., all rely upon the security of the underlying channel. In this work we define channel protocols, as well as security for channels constructed from stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption (stLHAE) schemes. Furthermore, we initiate the concept of secure termination where, upon receipt of a signifying message, a receiver is guaranteed to have received every message that has been sent, and will ever be sent, on the channel. We apply our results to real-world protocols, linking the channel environment to previous analyses of TLS 1.2, and demonstrating that TLS 1.2 achieves secure termination via fatal alerts and close_notify messages, per the specification of the Alert Protocol.
CITATION STYLE
Boyd, C., & Hale, B. (2019). Secure channels and termination: The last word on TLS. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11368 LNCS, pp. 44–65). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25283-0_3
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