Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function. © 2006 Springer-Verlag.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Contini, S., & Yin, Y. L. (2006). Forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using hash collisions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4284 LNCS, pp. 37–53). https://doi.org/10.1007/11935230_3
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