Civil-military relations: Continuity and change in an age of terror

Abstract

Many of the domestic and international security measures adopted after the shock of 11 September 2001 pose new and unwelcome risks to both the old and the new democratic systems. The relationship between the armed forces, the security services and the society they are designed to serve and protect requires renewed attention and vigilance. Achieving the right relationship between soldiers and the elected politicians and their civil servants has posed a dilemma for policymakers, civilian bureaucrats and the professional soldiers of the state since the birth of democracy. The existence of an armed, disciplined group governed by their own, often-secretive hierarchy within the framework of a state, is in many ways the antithesis of the democratic ideal. For much of the past century, however, the issue of the subordination of the military to its elected civilian masters did not find a place at the top of the list of concerns in western democracies. Still, there have been disturbing instances of a breakdown of the oftenuneasy truce between soldiers and their civilian masters even within the relatively solid framework of the established democracies. These events, especially when they became public, have cast a harsh and unwelcome light on this sensitive and sometimes prickly issue. The well-known attempt by General Douglas McArthur, during the Korean War, to decisively influence the major strategic decisions of the U.S. Government regarding the conduct of the conflict brought him into direct confrontation with President Harry Truman. Even in a well-established democracy like the United States, it was not immediately clear that Truman would prevail given the huge popularity and respect enjoyed by McArthur amongst the general public and many of the politicians of the day. This event rekindled concern over the issue of the coexistence of a powerful, 'parallel' and clearly undemocratic element within a free and democratic society. It was a reminder that all was not necessarily well in the area of civil and democratic control of armed forces even in those countries with a long history of relatively successful civil-military relationships and democratic institutions. Instances such as this notwithstanding, during the long years of the Cold War most western countries had become pretty complacent about the state of civil-military relations within their societies. It was an issue that rarely registered as a concern amongst the general public or the media. The sudden end of the apparent stability of the Cold War, in 1989-91, forced a refocus of thinking on civil-military relations by western governments and their armed forces. The new cooperation between the West and the newly established democracies of the former Soviet bloc highlighted the issue in stark terms. The problem of the correct relationship between armies, security services and their civilian leaders became evident even to those in western countries who had not previously paid much attention to it. It became clear that an essential priority in helping former Communist states move toward western-style democracy was to ensure that newly elected democratic leaders had both the will and the tools to guide and control the uniformed services in accordance with their mandate from their voters. This realisation spurred a re-examination of the civil-military 'models' in the 'old' western democracies engaged in the process of helping their new friends in the east. It became obvious that the West had no single model to offer. Each of the old democracies had its distinct approach to the issue of civil-military relations and very few of them had formally codified it. Most western models had proved relatively successful but all had evolved from long and unique political and historical experience. A major difficulty in introducing democratic and civilian control of the armed forces in the emerging democracies lay in the fact that many of these countries had no recent tradition to fall back upon. To make matters more complicated, the out-going Communist system had blurred the dividing line between generations of military officers and the party officials and bureaucrats that ran the state apparatus. © Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2005.