The Sociology of Reasons: Or Why “Epistemic Factors” are Really “Social Factors”

Abstract

The critics of the sociology of knowledge have produced a variety of interesting responses and counter arguments. Their objections are launched from very different standpoints, and the profile of their concessions is different in each case. On the one hand there is the sympathetic treatment of Gutting, who accepts the ‘symmetry’ requirement for sociological explanation, but denies its relativist implications. On the other hand, there is the more sweeping dismissal of Jarvie, who wants to sever the mere beliefs of scientists from what he calls ‘science as such’. Perhaps the line of critical commentary that contains most promise is that of Nicholas. His observation, that there is a considerable overlap between the ‘interest model’ of belief and recent work in decision and confirmation theory, is a valuable one. The programme of relating different inductive strategies to socially structured utilities is certainly one in which sociologists, historians and philosophers could cooperate.1 Gaston’s down-to-earth emphasis on the learning process indicates a similar point of contact between the disciplines. The most intriguing and colourful of the criticisms, however, comes from Butts.