This article addresses the question of the legitimacy of sports organizations, with a particular focus on the football organization FIFA. By applying elements of the public choice theory as well as the concept of political machines to FIFA, we show that the FIFA leadership established an allocation system that works on a discretionary basis in addition to the formal rule-based allocation process. FIFA uses this exchange system to please selected member associations, which in return vote in favor of the leadership's plans and secure its legitimacy. We further illustrate that such a system can only exist in the long run if the majority of both internal and external stakeholders approves the system.
CITATION STYLE
Richau, L., Emrich, E., & Follert, F. (2019). Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA’s Legitimacy under Blatter and Infantino. Economists’ Voice. https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2019-0014
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