Innovación militar en el Ejército español durante la guerra de Marruecos (1921-1927)

Abstract

The analysis of the performance by Spanish Army during the Moroccan War indicates that the strategic shock of the Annual Disaster in 1921 forced the military to modify their doctrine, organization and operational procedures to increase their effectiveness against the Riffian rebels. This analysis is based on Anglo-Saxon and Israeli military innovation theories, establishing the interrelation between their main elements to provide an explanation of processes of change during the selected timeframe. The article also analyzes the push for innovation from the senior military level, the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Navy, as well as the way in which the incorporation of new technology transformed the way to make war by Spaniards. Due to the lack of human sources, difficulties related to the explanation of bottom-up innovation processes have been found, highlighting the importance of qualitative data for military innovation studies. This historical case study is a contribution from a Political Science perspective that aims to fill a gap in the Spanish academic literature and to infer theoretical conclusions about the way military change takes place in Spain.