Secure biometric authentication for weak computational devices

Abstract

This paper presents computationally "lightweight" schemes for performing biometric authentication that carry out the comparison stage without revealing any information that can later be used to impersonate the user (or reveal personal biometric information). Unlike some previous computationally expensive schemes - which make use of slower cryptographic primitives - this paper presents methods that are particularly suited to financial institutions that authenticate users with biometric smartcards, sensors, and other computationally limited devices. In our schemes, the client and server need only perform cryptographic hash computations on the feature vectors, and do not perform any expensive digital signatures or public-key encryption operations. In fact, the schemes we present have properties that make them appealing even in a framework of powerful devices capable of public-key signatures and encryptions. Our schemes make it computationally infeasible for an attacker to impersonate a user even if the attacker completely compromises the information stored at the server, including all the server's secret keys. Likewise, our schemes make it computationally infeasible for an attacker to impersonate a user even if the attacker completely compromises the information stored at the client device (but not the biometric itself, which is assumed to remain attached to the user and is not stored on the client device in any form). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.