Beyond eCK: Perfect forward secrecy under actor compromise and ephemeral-key reveal

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Abstract

We show that it is possible to achieve perfect forward secrecy in two-message key exchange (KE) protocols that satisfy even stronger security properties than provided by the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. In particular, we consider perfect forward secrecy in the presence of adversaries that can reveal the long-term secret keys of the actor of a session and reveal ephemeral secret keys. We propose two new game-based security models for KE protocols. First, we formalize a slightly stronger variant of the eCK security model that we call eCK w. Second, we integrate perfect forward secrecy into eCK w, which gives rise to the even stronger eCK-PFS model. We propose a security-strengthening transformation (i.e., a compiler) between our new models. Given a two-message Diffie-Hellman type protocol secure in eCK w, our transformation yields a two-message protocol that is secure in eCK-PFS. As an example, we show how our transformation can be applied to the NAXOS protocol. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

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APA

Cremers, C., & Feltz, M. (2012). Beyond eCK: Perfect forward secrecy under actor compromise and ephemeral-key reveal. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7459 LNCS, pp. 734–751). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_42

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