Maritime Regime Building in East Asia

Abstract

From an institutionalist point of view, boundary arrangements can increase certainty, reduce transactions costs, and thus facilitate international cooperation. Yet the task of delimiting national boundaries, whether land or maritime, is often time consuming, requiring strong political will and tireless diplomatic efforts of all neighboring states with conflicting claims. In the process of boundary delimitation, some important political decisions have to be made in each stage. Bernard H. Oxman (1994/1995: 255) identifies four important political decisions to be made in relation to boundaries, unless military options are brought to table: (1) the decision to negotiate; (2) the decision to propose a particular boundary; (3) the decision to make concessions with a view to reaching agreement; and (4) the decision to agree on a particular boundary. At the same time, all negotiating ­parties must take into account the effect of any proposal they make on their relations with their neighbors. Though selfish and conflictual unless given appropriate conditions under which to cooperate, states, both small and large, are often concerned about the reputation costs that would be incurred should they fail to comply with international rules and norms. Unless they are willing to use unrelated resources (either as carrots or as sticks) to obtain a favorable boundary, their proposal must be based upon more than unrestrained self-interest. The search for a proposal that has a plausible legal and equitable foundation will thus entail (Oxman 1994/1995: 261).