The organizational specificities of brite-euram collaborative projects: Micro-analysis and policy implications

Abstract

The aim of our chapter is to examine and characterize EU-sponsored R and D collaborations at the micro-analytical level, and to derive some policy implications. The existing literature on European framework research programmes relies, in the main, on quantitative, statistical information. We think that the relevance and the efficiency of such programmes may well require a deeper understanding of the cooperative practices adopted by the companies that participate in government-sponsored collaborations. Our contribution can be considered as an attempt at opening this specific "interorganizational black box" at the micro level of the firm More precisely, we will explore the internal mechanisms of government-sponsored collaborations by comparing them to those of spontaneous, privately funded research collaborations Our work is based on the existing literature con-ceming inter-firm alliances and on qualitative, empirical information obtained through numerous interviews relating to some of the research and development (R and D) projects within the EU's Brite-Euram programme. As a conceptual framework, we propose to consider inter-firm technological collaborations as particular forms of organizations that aim at creating new knowledge via the association of the resources of two or more independent firms We adopt the approach of March and Simon (1993) that organizations are "systems of co-ordinated actions among individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ". Thus, an organization coordinates the actions of agents characterized by different knowledge bases and different interests. As a consequence, we suggest that any organizational mode (but particularly inter-firm collaboration) must fulfil the following three functions: coordination, incentive, and learning Our chapter applies this three-dimensional grid in order to understand the micro-mechanisms of inter-firm technological collaborations. The chapter is organized as follows. In the first part we synthesize the relevant results from the literature about strategic management of technological alliances (focusing mainly, although not exclusively, on spontaneous research collaborations). Important issues generally concern: the motivations of the partners in connection with potentially opportunistic behaviour; the mechanisms of inter-organizational learning and value creation; the influence of contractual terms and other internal coordination devices of alliances. This allows us to apply our previously mentioned, threedimensional, analytical grid (in terms of incentives, learning, and coordination) to explain some important aspects of the micro-rationale of inter-firm collaboration emerging from the literature. In the second part of the chapter we again apply this grid in order to identify the specificities of "our" Brite-Euram research projects, and then try to compare them with ideal spontaneous collaborations. We contend that the two types of collaborations show rather contrasting rationales: government-sponsored collaborations most often concern peripheral activities, submit to pre-defined rules, and favour exploratory, unilateral learning; by contrast spontaneous collaborations concern activities closer to core competences, create their own operating rules, and may trigger an interactive learning process, which generates valuable collective specific assets. Evolution pathways also differ: government-sponsored collaborations seem to be more stable in the short term (no premature end), but less persistent in the long term. Finally, we derive some policy implications resulting from the identification of two different collaborative patterns. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.