Abstract
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Also, we present an analysis for uniformly random allocations which are naturally truthful in expectation. These results simplify or improve previous results of Lipton et al. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., & Kyropoulou, M. (2009). On low-envy truthful allocations. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5783 LNAI, pp. 111–119). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10
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