In this paper, I argue that some of the disagreements about the continuity or discontinuity of human moral life with that of animals can be assuaged by drawing a distinction between two senses in which someone can be a ‘moral being’: being a moral agent (i.e. being morally responsible for one’s action) and being a moral judge (i.e. being able to form moral judgments). More precisely, I argue that it is not necessary to be a moral judge to be a moral agent, because moral actions (actions we are morally responsible for) don’t need to stem from moral judgments. Consequently, I argue that, even if moral judgment is highly likely to be a human specificity, moral agency is something that we might share with other animals, given that the only requisite to be a moral agent is to be able to be motivated by the fact that other entities do have interests.
CITATION STYLE
Cova, F. (2013). Two Kinds of Moral Competence: Moral Agent, Moral Judge. In Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Vol. 31, pp. 117–130). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6343-2_7
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