In this paper we extend the approximation based theoretical framework in which the security problem - secrecy preservation against an intruder - may be semi-decided through a reachability verification. We explain how to cope with algebraic properties for an automatic approximation-based analysis of security protocols. We prove that if the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular tree language, then the security problem may by semi-decided for protocols using cryptographic primitives with algebraic properties. More precisely, an automatically generated approximation function enables us 1) an automatic normalization of transitions, and 2) an automatic completion procedure. The main advantage of our approach is that the approximation function makes it possible to verify security protocols with an arbitrary number of sessions. The concepts are illustrated on an example of the view-only protocol using a cryptographic primitive with the exclusive or algebraic property. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Boichut, Y., Héam, P. C., & Kouchnarenko, O. (2006). Handling algebraic properties in automatic analysis of security protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4281 LNCS, pp. 153–167). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11921240_11
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.