Harn and Lin proposed in 2010 a secret sharing-based group key transfer protocol. One year later, Nam et al. showed their construction is vulnerable to a replay attack and proposed a way to fix it. Recently, Yuan et al. analyzed the same protocol, proved that it is also vulnerable to a man-in-the middle attack and considered a countermeasure. First, we slightly modify Yuan et al.’s attack to make it simpler to implement and harder to be detected. Second, we show that the improved version of the protocol remains susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.
CITATION STYLE
Olimid, R. F. (2015). On the (Non)improvement of an authenticated GKT protocol. In Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (Vol. 369, pp. 123–132). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_11
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