Strategy acquisition on multi-issue negotiation without estimating opponent's preference

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Abstract

In multi-issue negotiation, an opponent's preference is rarely open. Under this environment, it is difficult to acquire a negotiation result that realizes win-win negotiation. In this paper, we present a novel method for realizing win-win negotiation although an opponent's preference is not open. In this method, an agent learns how to make a concession to an opponent. To learn the concession strategy, we adopt reinforcement learning. In reinforcement learning, the agent recognizes a negotiation state to each issue in negotiation. According to the state, the agent makes a proposal to increase own profit. A reward of the learning is a profit of an agreement and punishment of negotiation breakdown. Experimental results showed that agents could acquire a negotiation strategy that avoids negotiation breakdown and increases profits of both sides. Finally, the agents can acquire the action policy that strikes a balance between cooperation and competition. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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APA

Yoshikawa, S., Yasumura, Y., & Uehara, K. (2008). Strategy acquisition on multi-issue negotiation without estimating opponent’s preference. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4953 LNAI, pp. 371–380). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78582-8_38

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