Abstract
We present a reduction semantics for the LYSA calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Gao, H., Bodei, C., Degano, P., & Nielson, H. R. (2007). A formal analysis for capturing replay attacks in cryptographic protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4846 LNCS, pp. 150–165). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_15
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