Raíces griegas de la noción romana de culpa

Abstract

The article deals with the connections between Greek expressions aμαρtíα and aμάρtnμα, used by Aristotle regarding the voluntary and involuntary actions and the Roman notion of guilt. One part of the doctrine has related said terms with negligence, while aδiκíα or aδiκnμ α would relate with fraud and atúxnμα with casus. Another area maintains the independence of Roman guilt or its identification within a wider sense of the expression, with aδiκíα. The article concludes that the expression aμάρtnμα hits the nerve of guilt, because in both concepts there is a faulty behavior (not a faulty will). For this reason, ignorance is also present in the concept of guilt, because the subject ignores, has erred or failed in the provision required. However, based on this initial coincidence it is possible to state that the notion of guilt devised by Roman jurisprudence was a true technical contribution to the Law.