Strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property

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Abstract

We provide an axiomatic framework for the the well studied lexicographical improvement property and derive new results on the existence of strong Nash equilibria for a very general class of congestion games with bottleneck objectives. This includes extensions of classical load-based models, routing games with splittable demands, scheduling games with malleable jobs, and more. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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Harks, T., Klimm, M., & Möhring, R. H. (2009). Strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5929 LNCS, pp. 463–470). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_43

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