Feeling

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Abstract

This article attempts to establish on a psychological basis some foundational principles of a philosophy of mind grounded in process (microgenetic) and evolutionary theory, with a focus on the microoral or diachronic aspects of mental contents and the derivation and intra-psychic structure of the mind/brain states in which they are ingredients. The subjectivity of the approach is in contrast to the externalist stance of cognitivist theory, a distinction with a venerable history. For example, Bosanquet asked, "is mental growth a process of compounding units . . . or a process of discrimination?" and cited James as preferring to begin with "the more concrete mental aspects . . . (and go) to elements we come to know by way of abstraction." James went on to write that the "process of building-up the mind out of its units of composition has the merit of expository elegance, and gives a neatly subdivided table of contents; but it often purchases these advantages at the cost of reality and truth." James insisted on a focus on entire conscious states rather than "the postmortem study of their comminuted elements (which is) the study of artificial abstractions, not of natural things.".

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APA

Brown, J. (2014). Feeling. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 35(1–2), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11758.003.0010

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