Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning

Abstract

The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments. In Study 1, we show that this is the case for rapid judgments requiring a distinction between simple logical form and for a novel form of judgment, the ability to identify inferences that are not linked to their premises (non sequiturs). In Study 2, we show that strategy use is related to the ability to make the kinds of rapid logical judgments previously examined over and above contributions of working memory capacity. Study 3 shows that strategy use explains individual variability in rapid logical responding with belief-biased inferences over and above the contribution of IQ. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that under severe time constraint cognitive capacity is a very poor predictor of reasoning, while strategy use becomes a stronger predictor. These results extend the notion that people can make rapid intuitive “logical” judgments while highlighting the importance of strategy use as a key individual difference variable.