If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" thought experiment. © Springer Science+Business Media 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Bostrom, N. (2006). Quantity of experience: Brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness. Minds and Machines, 16(2), 185–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-006-9036-0
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