Ethics and Empirical Psychology – Critical Remarks to Empirically Informed Ethics

Abstract

The question of whether ethics should be empirically informed has a rhetorical ring to it—how could it be better to be uninformed? Exciting developments in a number of disciplines studying human beings, from psychology and cognitive science to biology, offer hope that ethics, too, could make steady progress were it to hitch its wagons to the train of science. So it is no surprise that some want to erase what they see as outdated and old-fashioned disciplinary boundaries, and no bigger surprise that others react by reaffirming traditional methodologies or by retreating to the grand journals of old. My instinct is on the side of caution in this debate, but I will refrain from grand pronouncements. Disciplinary border skirmishes seem to invite the greatest sin in writing—being boring. In contrast, particular arguments that aim to make concrete progress with existing questions by exploiting a novel methodology can be stimulating even when they go wrong.