Abstract
Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. This paper introduces a 7-round impossible differential of Camellia including FL/FL -1 layer. Utilizing impossible differential attack, 10-round Camellia-128 is breakable with 2 118.5 chosen plaintexts and 2 123.5 10 round encryptions. Moreover, 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 can also be analyzed, the time complexity are about 2 130.4 and 2 194.5, respectively. Comparing with known attacks on reduced round Camellia including FL/FL -1 layer, our results are better than all of them. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
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Li, L., Chen, J., & Jia, K. (2011). New impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7092 LNCS, pp. 26–39). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_4
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