Neuroethics: A Renewed View of Morality? Intentions and the Moral Point of View

Abstract

In the traditional view of morality, intentions play a central role: they define what a typical action consists of and allow for the assignment of both blame and praise. Actions are intentional bodily movements, and if actions are morally assessed, it is first and foremost because they are intentional. Recently, several psychologists have investigated the neural basis of these mental phenomena. Although many studies confirm the traditional view, others point in the opposite direction: intentions play only a subordinate role in morality. For Joshua Knobe, intentionality is not central but depends on ascriptions of responsibility, far from grounding them. For Joshua Greene, moral judgement is based on intentions only when we rely on alarm emotions. If these studies are found to be convincing, it would oblige us to modify our view of morality: responsibility would be linked with outcomes rather than with intentions. On the legal level, the doctrine of mens rea would also be modified, and perhaps even abandoned. Neuroethics would then be a field that purports to offer a renewed view of morality. However, I think that a careful examination of the data and their interpretation shows that this conclusion is mistaken: intentions remain at the centre of morality even if it is not easily noticed in some situations, especially when side effects are involved.